Reflections on Climate Change and Trade by Bhagwati, Jagdish N.
Reflections on Climate Change and Trade
Let me start with a general comment that is relevant as background to thetheme of this book, and then move on to some of the specifics of the inter-
face between trade, the World Trade Organization, and the environment that
many of the chapters above have addressed. At the outset, we need to remem-
ber that those who work on trade (mostly academics) and those who work on
the environment (mostly activists) have traditionally been at loggerheads from
time to time.
Why? One important philosophical difference that underlies much of this
tension, which I think we tend to forget, is that trade economists are typically
considering and condemning governmental interventions (specifically, protec-
tionism, such as the imposition of tariffs and nontariff barriers) mainly as
creating distortions and harming the general welfare. Conversely, environ-
mentalists are typically dealing with what are best described as “missing
markets” (for example, people dump carcinogens into lakes, rivers, and oceans
and emit them into the atmosphere, and they do not have to pay for the pollu-
tion). Therefore, they see government intervention (for example, the use of
 pollution- pay taxes or the use of tradable permits) as correcting a distortion. It
is useful to recall this fundamental difference in the experiences and lifestyles
of the people on the two sides of the  trade- and- environment aisle, because it
underlies and explains, to some extent, the occasional frictions between them.
Of course, trade and the environment are integrally related, and that is why
many disputes were coming up at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)—the most important being, of course, the celebrated  dolphin- tuna case
between the United States and Mexico. I will return to the important issues
raised by the  dolphin- tuna jurisprudence and its later reversal in the  shrimp-
 turtle dispute, also involving the United States. But let us start with the problems
raised by global warming.
In his comment on chapters 5 and 6, Daniel Drezner points out that, in the
past, America has opted for  short- run adjustment costs with a view to  long- run
gain. I do not quite know what he means by  “short- run adjustment costs,” but
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I would simply say that an enlightened hegemon like the United States, when
going in for the GATT, certainly did not insist on the developing countries hav-
ing reciprocal obligations. It simply gave away membership. It was, in fact,
getting the developing countries into the GATT while gaining nothing in terms
of an immediate, reciprocal opening of markets.
I think the intention was to create more legitimacy for the GATT by increas-
ing membership. Down the road, then, you would have graduation and begin
to “collect”—via what is called extended reciprocity or intergenerational rec-
iprocity. There were no  short- run costs à la Drezner either. After all, the
developing countries at that time, in the mid-1940s, were not important mar-
kets anyway; nor were they, by and large, major exporters. They were really
small players in world trade, and it was only later, when they had grown, that
the usual question of reciprocity would become economically relevant.
So one may ask why this argument does not work with the Kyoto Protocol
at the moment. Why are we not willing to play that old GATT game? I think
we need to look into this question carefully to get a sense of where the prob-
lems might be with how we approach the design of the successor pact to
 Kyoto— what I like to call Kyoto II.
A key problem, of course, is that there are two big players, India and China,
with current and prospective emissions of carbon dioxide that are simply large
for India and huge for China. We did not have anything like this at the time the
GATT was formed; then, as noted, the developing countries were all little play-
ers in trade, for all practical purposes. Exempting India and China from the
emission obligations of a climate change treaty today is thus not like exempt-
ing the developing countries from trade obligations in the 1940s. Moreover,
India and China are not willing to make any payment to get into the Kyoto club,
as it were, simply because they  feel— and this is where, I think, the real crux
comes  in— that they did not contribute to past environmental damages.
Now, if one looks at the past environmental damages, it is clear that the accu-
mulated fossil fuel carbon dioxide for 1850 to 2005 shows the damage attributable
to India and China is about 10 percent, whereas the countries now belonging to
the European Union, Russia, and the United States jointly account for over 60
percent. So you have basically what I have called a “stock” problem,1 the prob-
lem of “past” damage to the  environment— for which America and the EU,
basically, are particularly responsible. And the solution to this “stock” problem
in the Kyoto Protocol, which was devised to bring India and China on board,
was to say, “Look, because we were the ones who imposed large losses on the
environment in the past, and not you, we will exempt you from any ‘flow’ obli-
gation for reducing the current damage, no matter how large.” 
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Now, the problem is that, in so designing the Kyoto Protocol, its framers
were trying to kill two birds with one stone. And, of course, that stone is not
something  palatable— to mix  metaphors— to the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Sen-
ate virtually unanimously rejected Kyoto in 1997 because its members thought
that India and China were going to be free riders, when in fact the free ride was
being provided because they had not been riding for almost a hundred years
while America had been! I think that the general feeling instead was that these
countries were being let off simply because they were developing countries,
presumably on a progressive taxation ground; but progressive taxation has
become increasingly a hard sell (though the Barack Obama administration may
well restore it to some respectability). 
In sum, India and China were not free riders. Rather, their governments were
saying to the Western nations: “Look, you have done a lot of damage. You’ve
got this ‘stock’ liability for past emissions. And you cannot just get us to accept
significant ‘flow’ liability for current emissions while you do nothing signifi-
cant on the stock side.”
Thus, I have always felt that the Kyoto Protocol was doomed, in a way,
because it really could not be effective, as designed, until we addressed this
particular basic issue clearly and directly in a transparent  manner— forgoing
the fudge that mixed up the stock and the flow dimensions of the obligations.
And I think this problem is going to afflict Kyoto II as well. Frankly, what we
are negotiating so far shows little willingness on the part of today’s rich, devel-
oped countries to accept the notion that they must pay for past damages; and
so it would be little short of ethical nonsense for them to ask India and China
to accept much larger flow obligations.
Now, this unwillingness to face up to the liability for past carbon emissions
is rather strange, in the sense that the United States has already accepted,2 in
its domestic environmental practice, the superfund approach under which, for
hazardous waste, liability has been assigned, in eligible industries, for past dam-
ages, even when the pollution was not regarded at the time to be harmful.
America is a nation that thrives on torts; indeed the Democratic Party does also,
and it cannot be denied that America has actually accepted the superfund
approach in its own environmental policy.
So, in my judgment, for us to go around saying that India and China have
to accept obligations on the flow  side— which I think is perfectly  appropriate—
 while doing nothing like a substantial superfund for past carbon emissions on
the stock side, is to invite condemnation as a superpower play by nations, both
the EU members and the United States, that are no longer quite the superpow-
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ers that they were once. You really need to walk on two legs and not just on
one leg. 
I see statements all the time, from even Al Gore and Bill Clinton, about the
desirability of China and India accepting flow obligations. But unless I have
missed something, neither has publicly acknowledged the need for a substan-
tial superfund for the U.S. stock liability. So much for their environmentalism:
 self- serving for the United States, not cosmopolitan and just.
Now, the same problem arises in trade negotiations because India, and sev-
eral developing nations, say to America, “How can you have to this day sizable
 trade- distorting agricultural subsidies, and then expect us to open our agricul-
tural sector to competition from such subsidized exports by you?” In fact, the
Doha Round multilateral trade talks collapsed in August 2008 precisely because
India claimed that nearly  two- thirds of its people were in the farming sector,
most were subsistence farmers, and the United States had only 2 million, often
large, farmers with much larger subsidy support. So, India wanted a special
safeguards mechanism that, in my view, was excessively cautious, citing our
subsidies. Remember, of course, that the United States itself had introduced
special safeguards against China; and that nothing works better to get protec-
tion than to allege, often without any basis, that the exporters are “unfairly”
subsidizing exports to us. Yet, when the talks collapsed, the U.S. trade repre-
sentative and an obliging media, and Congress in turn, zeroed in on India as
the rejectionist culprit. 
So, as one draws analogies between trade and the environment, it is neces-
sary to remember that unless America brings to both negotiations, each of
which is extremely important, the notion that it cannot just impose what it wants
on others, often to its presumed advantage regardless of the others’, it is likely
to meet with failure. Charles Kindleberger famously called the United States
an “altruistic hegemon.” I fear that it has increasingly tended in recent years to
become a selfish hegemon.
I should add that it is not just the United States that is a problem. I see lit-
tle attention being paid to the stock problem in Europe either. As then–senator
Obama said about Senator John McCain: He is a good man; it is just that he
does not get it. Thus, when I was in Florence recently, and Tony Blair was in
the chair and talking about what he was doing on the environment, Kishore
Mahbubani, myself, and others from the developing countries drew his atten-
tion to the superfund idea. He continued through the session as if he had heard
nothing. As then–senator Obama would have said: Prime Minister Blair just
does not get it. But unless he, Gore, Clinton, and others do get it, do not expect
that Kyoto II can be signed and ratified by India, China, the United States, and
European Union. 
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Now, let us turn to the problem raised by the  notion— fashionable in Con-
gress these  days— that if India and China do not accept green house emissions
obligations, America would impose a “border tax,” better called an import duty,
that is equal to the carbon tax that they are not imposing in sync with Amer-
ica’s. This is, of course, like the idea that the French floated against the United
States, saying they would tax American exports to the EU because America
had not signed the Kyoto Protocol. This issue, of course, takes us back to the
 tuna- dolphin case in 1991 at the GATT. When  tuna- dolphin came up, the envi-
ronmentalists were terribly upset that the United States lost the case. At that
time, I happened to be the economic policy adviser to Arthur Dunkel, the
 director- general of GATT. And so I was consulted by the legal adviser, Frieder
Roessler, on the ongoing case and what the position of the GATT Secretariat
should be. The focus at the time was whether specific process and production
methods (PPM) should be allowed to be prescribed for import  eligibility— that
is, could the United States specify that tuna should be allowed to be imported
only if  purse- seine nets that also caught dolphins were not used?
Coming from the economic side, I felt that PPMs, as a general case, should
not be allowed to be so used to regulate the entry of imports because they could
thus be used to discriminate against specific suppliers while appearing to be
nondiscriminatory. After all, those involved in international trade have all been
brought up on the famous apocryphal example (based, however, on a real case)
of imported cheese being taxed by Germany if it was produced by cows graz-
ing at 4,500 feet and above, with bells around them and under Alpine conditions.
This was obviously aimed at Swiss cheese, although, in principle, if Tanzania
were to satisfy the conditions, Tanzanian cheese would be equally subjected to
the same high tariff. The use of the PPM could then defeat the intent of nondis-
crimination required by the GATT.
So we were coming at the PPM issue from the trade side, because the GATT
was a trade institution. And we did not really think of the environmental aspect
specifically at that particular point (except that, if the issue fell under Article
XX, greater leeway was permissible). 
Thus the position we took was that the legitimation of a free use of PPMs
to regulate imports would open the door to the indiscriminate use of de facto
discrimination in trade among different suppliers, undercutting the basic prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination underlying the GATT. Anybody could say the way
you produce something, no matter how or why, is unacceptable. We could not
see how de facto discrimination could be contained; it could proliferate hugely.
But the  shrimp- turtle decision years later, by the Appellate Body of the World
Trade Organization, basically reversed the  dolphin- tuna jurisprudence, ignor-
ing our caution. It meant that we would now be opening the floodgates for all
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kinds of PPM prescriptions that would afflict anyone, on any issue (though we
had also argued that the situation would be asymmetrical between weaker and
stronger nations because it was unlikely that the weaker nations could take on
the stronger nations in this essentially arbitrary  fashion— a worry that has also
been expressed by prominent nongovernmental organizations in the develop-
ing countries). 
I was among the few who thought that this decision was ill judged, reveal-
ing the weakness of an Appellate Body where familiarity with legal jurisprudence
and practice is not a requirement for an appointment. Now, I would simply say
that the chickens have come home to roost against the United States itself. The
French plan to tax imports from the United States because the United States had
not signed on to the Kyoto Protocol was exactly the kind of thing I had pre-
dicted. And now the United States, which has among the lowest gasoline prices
in the world, absurdly believes that, instead of being subjected to PPM restric-
tions itself on grounds of inadequate energy prices, it can put import taxes on
such PPM grounds against India and China.
And, frankly, what would then prevent India from discriminating against
U.S. exports on the ground that the United States does not have a superfund?
I could go on endlessly. This way lies chaos, just as I had argued to Roessler,
and to Dunkel, during the  dolphin- tuna panel’s deliberations.
I think America needs to be very careful about not going down the route that
has been opened up by the U.S. legislation and the World Trade Organization’s
ruling in support of it in the  shrimp- turtle case. If America goes down that leg-
islative route, it is likely to be the loser in the  end— certainly on energy and the
environment. Thus, Congress needs to be told that this is a game everybody
can play.
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